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1. Introduction
I thank the organizers for the invitation to
comment some papers presented at the confer-
ence, a very difficult task when you’re deal-
ing with a character like that Boscovich, that,
according to Lancelot Law Whythe “. . . was
mathematician, physicist, astronomer, geode-
sist, surveyor, engineer and architect as well
as a poet, diplomatist, social figure and much-
traveled personality. He combined the Roman
subtlety with Serb vigor, and Slavonic intensity
of imagination with Western logical precision.”
But a few observations are worth it.
2. Boscovich
Compared to a few decades ago, all docu-
mentation of and on Boscovich you can ac-
cess is much richer. On the one hand the
Inventory of the Historical Archives of the
Brera Astronomical Observatory has been
completed and the catalogue of Boscovich’s
letters kept in the Archives was published.
In addition, digitization and publication
of all published works and manuscripts of
Boscovich is under construction. A job that
will allow scholars to access the extraordinary
amount of material currently scattered in li-
braries and archives all over the world.
Now we come to the papers of this meet-
ing. Some of them have offered methodolog-
ical cues as the first part of Proverbio’s an
that of Buzzi. Proverbio has stressed the need
to contextualize the ideas of Boscovich, ana-
lyzing philosophical and scientific culture of
his time, without crediting the Ragusan natu-
ral philosopher with points of view that don’t
belong to him and without considering him at
all costs a precursor of concepts that will ma-
ture later and in cultural and scientific contexts
totally different.
I would stress, however, that, along with
a historical reconstruction properly contextu-
alized, you must also analyze further develop-
ments of the natural philosophy in the nine-
teenth century. This way you can select ideas
and cultural atmosphere of the eighteenth cen-
tury that will later feed scientific researches.
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Buzzi’s paper allows us to understand how two
points of view are useful.
Buzzi talked about the opposition between
Frisi and Boscovich about Newtonian ap-
proach to the concept of matter. According to
Buzzi, Frisi had an idea of matter as something
“dead.” The main characteristic of the matter
(or more precisely of the mass) was to have an
intrinsic quality - inertia -, and the forces, from
outside, can change only the state of motion of
the mass. But, Buzzi points out, among masses
a force is exerted: matter is, therefore, also a
centre of force which, in Newtonian mechan-
ics, is inside the mass. Boscovich, according to
the Leibnitzian tradition, argues that the centre
of force can be external to the masses. Frisi was
perceived by his contemporaries, and in fact he
was, a researcher along the Newtonian tradi-
tion as developed by mathematical physicists
of the Acade´mie des Sciences. Laplace, at the
of end of the eighteenth century and in the first
decades of the nineteenth century, had written
a synthesis of the many contributions of math-
ematical physicists as d’Alembert, Lagrange,
Laplace himself, Euler to Newtonian mechan-
ics.
Laplacian/Newtonian synthesis was able to
give an account of the most intricate natural
phenomena: motion of the comets, inequali-
ties of Jupiter and Saturn, Moon’s motion, flat-
ness of the Earth, precession of the equinoxes,
etc.. In the early decades of the nineteenth
century the model begun to show inconsisten-
cies that made it difficult to deduce the be-
havior of some new phenomena. And, just
in celestial mechanics, a field in which the
Laplacian/Newtonian approach had collected
the most compelling successes, it turns out,
in the mid-nineteenth century, that the motion
of the perihelion of Mercury isn’t deducible
by the Newtonian principles. But astronomers
continue to use Newtonian mechanics for more
than a half century, until General Relativity de-
fined boundaries of applicability of Newtonian
mechanics.
However it is in the field of electricity and
magnetism that Newtonian approach shows its
greater limits. Oersted’s experiment (1821) (a
magnetic needle near a current carrying wire
rotates without moving his centre of gravity), is
completely unexpected on the basis of mechan-
ics which is able to describe natural phenom-
ena, and then the interaction between the mag-
net and current carrying wire, only in terms
of attraction and repulsion forces. And the
same difficulties are encountered when we try
to deduce from the principles of mechanics
the phenomenon of electromagnetic rotations
(1821), electromagnetic induction (1831) etc..
Interpretation of phenomena discovered in the
field of electricity and magnetism will stress
the relevance of the Boscovichian conceptions.
In summary Frisi’s approach seemed to be
heuristically more productive to the eyes of
the contemporaries. And indeed it was, at least
with regard to the celestial mechanics. But
some of the Boscovichian issues, which in the
eyes of some of his contemporaries (eg. French
mathematical physicists) could seem obsolete,
proved to be useful for the nineteenth-century
new theories of electricity and magnetism.
However, the issue of Boscovich contri-
bution to nineteenth-century scientific thought
is controversial, and many historians of sci-
ence are skeptical about the actual influ-
ence of Boscovich in the elaboration of
the new theories. Historiographical difficul-
ties arise, in my opinion, from the fact that
Boscovichian approach isn’t formalized, in
contrast to Newtonian mechanics, where there
is a formalized physics with its principles, its
theorems and proofs, its observational and ex-
perimental controls. Boscovich’s law of action
is more qualitative than quantitative and it is
difficult to infer from it the behavior of some
natural phenomenon. But, even if Boscovich
was only a metaphysical, nothing prevents us
to develop a historical reconstruction in which
Boscovichian “metaphysics” may provide a
convincing key to understand and to interpret
evolution of scientific thought in the nineteenth
century. About this question I will mention in
detail a Faraday’s memoir. But first I want to
quote an interesting problem raised in another
paper.
Luca Guzzardi asks an interesting method-
ological question: does actually W. F. Herschel
discover Uranus in 1781? The question is rea-
sonable. Herschel didn’t immediately qualify
the new star as a planet. He thought it was a
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comet, but at the same time he had doubts due
to some unexpected features of the celestial
object. Guzzardi’s question is interesting from
epistemological point of view only if we think
of the discovery as something that comes al-
ready formulated in all its details by the head
of the scientist, like Minerva from the head of
Jupiter. But we can object that the discovery
of something new is a process that ends only
when when scientists are able to put together
all the pieces of a complex puzzle. And this
process takes time.
But it is also reasonable to ask why some-
one argues that Herschel had “discovered” the
planet Uranus. In fact if you read the original
memoir of Herschel you realize that the as-
tronomer of Bath notes something strange in
the observed celestial object. It looks like a
comet but has no tail although it’s near to the
Sun. And Barnaba Oriani, when in his mem-
oir calculates the circular orbit of the “object”,
calls it “singularis cometa”. But in a subse-
quent memoir Oriani calculates the elliptical
orbit that actually makes sense, in the practice
of the astronomy of that time, only if you con-
sider the celestial object as a planet.
But why, despite the doubts, do these
astronomers call “comet” the new object?
Because few decades before, Halley’s comet
was rediscovered, whose passage was pre-
dicted by Newtonian mechanics, one of
its first significant observational evidence.
Astronomers were ready to “see” comets rather
than planets, whose numbers had been the
same since prehistoric times. But Herschel was
able to note unusual and abnormal behavior of
the object he was observing: a necessary step
in the discovery of a new phenomenon.
There were also more technical papers: I
have been able to follow some of them, others
less, due to my ignorance of course.
3. Faraday
Finally I want to mention and comment a mem-
oir of Faraday about the influence of Boscovich
on the development of nineteenth-century the-
ories of electricity and magnetism.
In a letter dated January 25, 1844 to
Richard Taylor, published in the Philosophical
Magazine as “A Speculation touching Electric
Conduction and Nature of Matter” Faraday ex-
poses his conception of the theory of matter.
Faraday begins by outlining the principles
of atomic theory which considered atoms as
material particles with volume. To each of
these atoms were associated, from the time of
its creation, the forces so that they could lump
together in order to form different substances
with different properties we can observe. These
atoms, while being grouped, are not in contact
with each other but are at a mutual distance:
the bodies being likely to change their size as
a result of compression, traction or heating. In
the “Speculation”, Faraday objects that
“The atomic doctrine . . . is not so carefully
distinguished from the facts, but that it often
appears . . . as a statement of the facts them-
selves, though it is at best but an assumption; of
the truth of which we can assert nothing, what-
ever we may say or think of its probability.
. . . But it is always safe and wise to dis-
tinguish, as much as is in our power, fact from
theory; . . . I cannot doubt but that he who,
as a wise philosopher, has most power of pen-
etrating the secrets of nature, and guessing by
hypothesis at her mode of working, will also be
most careful, for his own safe progress and that
of others to distinguish that knowledge which
consists of assumption, by which I mean theory
and hypothesis, from that which is the knowl-
edge of facts and laws; never raising the former
to the dignity or authority of the latter, nor con-
fusing the latter more than is inevitable with
the former.”
So according to Faraday the atomic theory
of Dalton is untenable.
“If the view of the constitution of matter
was correct, and we can speak of the particles
of matter and of the space between them as two
different things, then space must be taken as the
only continuous part. Space will permeate all
masses of matter in every direction, except that
in place of meshes it will form cells, isolating
each atom from its neighbors, and itself only
being continuous.”
Faraday shows, moreover, the absurdity of
the atomic theory about the empty space. In
accepting the ordinary atomic theory, space
should be a non-conductor in non-conducting
96 P. Tucci: Concluding remarks. Faraday on Boscovich
bodies, and a conductor in conducting bodies.
But if space be an insulator it cannot exist in
conducting bodies, and if it be a conductor it
cannot exist in insulating bodies.
At this point, Faraday claims that the phe-
nomena can be better explained by a theory of
matter as that one of Boscovich, who considers
atoms simply as centers of force.
“I am not ignorant that the mind is most
powerfully drawn by the phenomena of crys-
tallization, chemistry and physics generally, to
the acknowledgment of centers of force. I feel
myself constrained, for the present hypothet-
ically, to admit them, and cannot do without
them, but I feel great difficulty in the concep-
tion of atoms of matter which in solids, flu-
ids and vapors are supposed to be more or less
apart from each other, with intervening space
not occupied by atoms, and perceive great con-
tradictions in the conclusions which flow from
such a view.
If we must assume at all, as indeed in a
branch of knowledge like the present we can
hardly help it, then the safest course appears to
be to assume as little as possible, and in that re-
spect the atoms of Boscovich appear to me to
have a great advantage over the more usual no-
tion. His atoms, if I understand aright, are mere
centers of forces or powers, not particles of
matter, in which the powers themselves reside.
If, in the ordinary view of atoms, we call the
particle of matter away from the powers a, and
the system of powers or forces in and around
it m, then in Boscovich’s theory a disappears,
or is a mere mathematical point, whilst in the
usual notion it is a little unchangeable, impen-
etrable piece of matter, and m is an atmosphere
of force grouped around it.”
The theory of matter of Boscovich as-
sumes, according to Faraday, that the atoms
consist only of centres of force (and not mat-
ter). When atoms are reduced to mere cen-
tres of force, matter is present everywhere, and
there is no unoccupied space between them. In
gases the atoms touch each other as in solids.
“In many of the hypothetical uses made of
atoms, as in crystallography, chemistry, mag-
netism, &c., this difference in the assumption
makes little or no alteration in the results, but
in other cases, as of electric conduction, the
nature of light, the manner in which bodies
combine to produce compounds, the effects of
forces, as heat or electricity, upon matter, the
difference will be very great. . . .
To my mind, therefore, the a or nucleus
vanishes, and the substance consists of the
powers or m; and indeed what notion can we
form of the nucleus independent of its pow-
ers? all our perception and knowledge of the
atom, and even our fancy, is limited to ideas
of its powers: what thought remains on which
to hang the imagination of an a independent of
the acknowledged forces? A mind just entering
on the subject may consider it difficult to think
of the powers of matter independent of a sep-
arate something to be called the matter, but it
is certainly far more difficult, and indeed im-
possible, to think of or imagine that matter in-
dependent of the powers. Now the powers we
know and recognize in every phenomenon of
the creation, the abstract matter in none; why
then assume the existence of that of which we
are ignorant, which we cannot conceive, and
for which there is no philosophical necessity?”
Faraday continues with some considera-
tions on Boscovich model of atom.
“Before concluding these speculations I
will refer to a few of the important differ-
ences between the assumption of atoms con-
sisting merely of centres of force, like those
of Boscovich, and that other assumption of
molecules of something specially material,
having powers attached in and around them.
With the latter atoms a mass of matter consists
of atoms and intervening space, with the for-
mer atoms matter is everywhere present, and
there is no intervening space unoccupied by it.
In gases the atoms touch each other just as truly
as in solids. In this respect the atoms of water
touch each other whether that substance be in
the form of ice, water or steam; no mere inter-
vening space is present.
Doubtless the centres of force vary in their
distance one from another, but that which is
truly the matter of one atom touches the matter
of its neighbours. Hence matter will be con-
tinuous throughout, and in considering a mass
of it we have not to suppose a distinction be-
tween its atoms and any intervening space. The
powers around the centres give these centres
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the properties of atoms of matter; and these
powers again, when many centres by their con-
joint forces are grouped into a mass, give to
every part of that mass the properties of matter.
In such a view all the contradiction resulting
from the consideration of electric insulation
and conduction disappears. The atoms may be
conceived of as highly elastic, instead of be-
ing supposed excessively hard and unalterable
in form; . . . ”
Faraday concludes his work with a praise
of Mossotti’s theory because it lies in the direc-
tion of a common origin of gravitational, elec-
trical and aggregation forces.
Ottaviano Fabrizio Mossotti, from a theo-
retical different approach that kept the atom-
istic assumptions of molecular mechanics, had
come to a unitary representation of the forces
of nature that had some point of contact with
the theory of Boscovich. Faraday had received
from Mossotti the memoir “Sur le forces qui
re´gissent la consititution inte´rieure des corps”
in December 1836 and had sent it to Richard
Taylor for publication in Scientific Memoirs.
Is it enough to quote Faraday’s memoir
just mentioned to talk about the influence of
Boscovich on nineteenth-century theories of
electricity and magnetism, at least with regard
to Faraday?
Of course at the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury and at the first half of the nineteenth cen-
tury knowledge of Boscovich was part of a dif-
fused culture among the natural philosophers,
and often it occurred through readings of sec-
ondary sources. Certainly, few of them had
read the original memoirs of Boscovich. The
historiographical problem, then, is to under-
stand who were the authors that have been read
and which interpretation they provided of the
Boscovichian thought.
So on one hand it is very difficult to under-
stand to what extent the knowledge that some
natural philosophers had about Boscovich was
important in their training and in their re-
searches; on the other hand there is no doubt
that many of them were influenced by some
Boscovichian considerations.
Faraday’s memoir is very detailed and ref-
erences to the Ragusian natural philosopher
are very precise: they don’t seem at all only a
rhetorical artifice.
